By: Steven M. Taber, Esq.

Advanced Air Mobility (AAM) is frequently presented as aviation’s next great leap: quieter aircraft, shorter trips, reduced congestion, and new forms of regional connectivity. Pilot projects are underway across the country; partnerships between manufacturers, operators, and municipalities continue to proliferate; and regulatory pathways are steadily being assembled. See, e.g., U.S. DOT National Advanced Air Mobility Strategy, 2023. The prevailing narrative is one of inevitability and innovation.
For communities already living with aviation impacts, however, AAM raises a more cautious and enduring question. Whether AAM ultimately improves quality of life or compounds existing burdens will depend less on aircraft design than on how legal authority is exercised as concepts move into operation. The transition from demonstration to routine service is precisely the stage at which institutional choices harden into lived reality.

Read the rest of the article here.

Published Dec 10, 2025 at 2:32 PM

Four oil and gas companies that develop heavy oil from the Inglewood oil field were sued Wednesday after being accused of failing to address health and environmental concerns for those who live in the area.

The Los Angeles County government said it has filed the environmental justice lawsuit, claiming that the four oil and gas operators — Sentinel Peak Resources California, Freeport-McMoRan Oil & Gas LLC, Plains Resources and Chevron U.S.A.– allowed toxic pollutants to be let out into the air, land and water by failing to adequately decommission and seal inactive oil and gas wells. 

More than 25% of the Inglewood oil field are idle or no longer producing gas and oil, but they continue to emit toxins into the surrounding communities, the office of LA County Supervisor Holly Mitchell, whose 2nd district includes South LA areas, said in a statement. 

“Plugging idle oil and gas wells—so they no longer emit toxins into communities that have been on the frontlines of environmental injustice for generations—is not only the right thing to do, it’s the law,” Mitchell said in a statement. “At the very least, oil companies that have long profited from this land must uphold their responsibilities to properly close these wells and ensure they cause no further harm.”

The lawsuit also alleges that the companies “unjustly enriched themselves by investing their money elsewhere” without properly decommissioning the wells. 

The county is seeking civil penalties of up to $2,500 a day for each well from the current owner of the Inglewood well, Sentinel, committed unfair business practices.

Michell’s office argued that more than one million people live within 5 miles of the well as homes, apartments and other facilities surround the field. 

The idle wells have been inactive for at least 23 consecutive months. 

In 2023, Culver City and Sentinel Peak Resources reached a settlement, mandating the company to plug 15 wells by the end of 2027, with at least 3 wells needing to be capped every calendar year. 

Find a copy of the complaint here. See page 63 for details on the Unjust Enrichment claims.

Borland v. Sanders Lead Co., 369 So.2d 523, 529-30 (Ala. 1979) (permitting recovery for trespass upon intrusion of lead and sulfoxide particulates). https://law.justia.com/cases/alabama/supreme-court/1979/369-so-2d-523-1.html See also, Maryland Heights Leasing, Inc. v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 706 S.W.2d 218, 225-26 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (radioactive emissions may support trespass claim if radioactive material has been deposited on the property); Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 342 P.2d 790, 794 (Or. 1959) (operation by Defendants of an aluminum reduction plant caused certain fluoride compounds in the form of gases and particulates, invisible to the naked eye, to become airborne and settle on Plaintiffs' property, rendering it unfit for raising livestock. sufficient for recovery under trespass claim). The Borland Court (Ala. Sup. Ct) cited Restatement, Second, Torts, § 158, and particularly emphasized a portion of the Comments under this section, which recites:

"`In order that there may be a trespass under the rule stated in this Section, it is not necessary that the foreign matter should be thrown directly and immediately upon the other's land. It is enough that an act is done with knowledge that it will to a substantial certainty result in entry of foreign matters.'" The Colorado Supreme Court agreed in Hoery v. United States, 64 P.3d 214, 217 (Colo. 2003): [Plaintiffs] do not need to allege that Defendants intended to cause the particular hazards identified in the Complaint. Rather, to succeed on the trespass claim, the ​[​Plaintiffs] must show that the ​[​Defendants] intended to perform the acts that caused the harmful intrusion, and that they knew the intrusion​ would likely result.

Here, the agencies noted that air tours pass over a prime area for bighorn sheep lambing in the Badlands Park and that 70% of the sheep in the Park were lost in 2021 due to disease. As to the peregrine falcons, the agencies noted that a pair nested in Mount Rushmore Park in 2020 had four offspring, none of which survived. The agencies noted both species are susceptible to noise disturbance and that stressors such as air tour noise could impact their populations. The fact the agencies did not determine whether air tours directly caused the species’ population losses in the Parks, or that different flight altitudes and patterns may cause less harm, does not make the agencies’ Plans arbitrary or capricious.

See ruling here. 

Anti-commandeering law is related to Congress' Spending Clause powers (Art. I, Sec. 8, cl. 1 a.k.a. the "power of the purse"). The Supreme Court has been clear that the federal government cannot coerce state and local action by withholding federal funds. In 2012, in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, the Court declared unconstitutional a provision of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act that required state governments receiving Medicaid funds to provide coverage to those within 133 percent of the federal poverty level. Those not complying would lose all federal Medicaid funds. 

Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the Court, said that “[i]n this case, the financial ‘inducement’ Congress has chosen is much more than ‘relatively mild encouragement’ — it is a gun to the head.” The Court explained that “Medicaid spending accounts for over 20 percent of the average State’s total budget, with federal funds covering 50 to 83 percent of those costs. . . . The threatened loss of over 10 percent of a State’s overall budget, in contrast, is economic dragooning that leaves the States with no real option but to acquiesce in the Medicaid expansion.” Sound familiar?

Congress can also place requirements on the recipients of federal funds to regulate their conduct in exchange for federal funding. While funding conditions such as these are common, they are subject to constitutional limitations. First, funding conditions must provide clear notice to the recipient of what actions are required in exchange for federal funds and the consequences of noncompliance. Second, funding conditions must be related to the purposes of the federally funded program or activity. Third, although Congress may incentivize states to adopt a particular policy in order to obtain specific federal funds, it may not coerce state participation. Congress may not, for example, tie an existing funding source on which a state has come to rely on compliance with a new kind of requirement. Fourth, the funding condition may not violate an independent constitutional bar or the related unconstitutional conditions doctrine. So, what does a prohibition on cities enacting noise regulations or banning touch-and-go operations have to do with a grant to build a fence or airport improvement? And, now that cities are completely reliant on federal AIP grants to fund their operations, can Congress tie an existing funding source on which a state has come to rely on compliance with a new kind of requirement (continue to sell leaded aviation fuel or be fined $5,000 a day)? Isn't that a "gun to the head?" As for the final requirement, the grant conditions require cities to bargain away their police power -- the sovereign responsibility to protect public health, safety and welfare. That is unconstitutional. United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 874, (1996) (stating that the reserved powers doctrine was developed to prevent public contracts from becoming a "threat to the sovereign responsibilities of state governments").

Here is the City of Torrance's Brief in Opposition to the Petition of Zamperini Airport Preservation Society (ZAPS) to invalidate Torrance's ban on touch-and-go and other operations at its airport. It is a very solid presentation of the reasons why the City of Torrance has the power to limit these operations to reduce noise, using its airport proprietor's exemption to FAA preemption, and why ANCA does not apply to this ordinance (ANCA only applies to restrictions on Stage 2 or Stage 3 aircraft, which are not present at the Torrance Airport, and ANCA does not have a private right of action for third parties to use as the basis for standing).

It should also be noted: "the FAA has not written the City, stating that Ordinance 3930 is preempted or in conflict with ANCA; the FAA has not attempted to intervene in this case; and the FAA has not sought to file an amicus curiae brief in this action. Similarly, none of the airport-based flight schools has filed suit challenging Ordinance 3930; and no flight school has sought to intervene, or to file an amicus curiae brief in this case." [Clearly, the FAA wants no part of this suit, presumably because it thinks it would lose on preemption and cannot impose ANCA restrictions on Torrance, in part because Torrance has not taken FAA grant money since 1986, but also because, under its own plain language of the statute and rules, ANCA does not apply to these flight school aircraft.]

Files:

• RESPONDENT CITY OF TORRANCE’S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE
• REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION TO PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE
• DECLARATION OF RAFAEL HERRERA IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT CITY OF TORRANCE’S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE
  

Judge Denise J. Casper: ELECTRONIC ORDER entered re: 24 Motion to Remand to State Court. Having considered Plaintiffs' motion to remand this matter to state court, D. 24, Defendants' opposition to same, D. 33, and Plaintiffs' reply, D. 36, the Court ALLOWS the motion. Standard of Review. Upon the filing of a motion to remand, the Court must assess whether it "would have had original jurisdiction of the case had it been filed in [this] court" initially. BIW Deceived v. Local S6, Indus. Union of Marine & Shipbuilding Workers of Am., IAMAW Dist. Lodge 4, 132 F.3d 824, 832 (1st Cir. 1997) (quoting Grubbs v. General Elec. Credit Corp., 405 U.S. 699, 702 (1972)). When a plaintiff files an action in state court and the defendant responds by invoking federal jurisdiction through removal, the defendant has the burden of establishing that removal to the district court is proper. Danca v. Private Health Care Sys., Inc., 185 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1999). The defendant "must... make a 'colorable' showing that a basis for federal jurisdiction exists." Id. (quoting BIW Deceived, 132 F.3d at 832). "Generally, [d]oubts about the propriety of removing an action should be resolved in favor of remand." Miara v. First Allmerica Fin. Life Ins. Co., 379 F. Supp. 2d 20, 26 (D. Mass. 2005) (alteration in original) (citation omitted). Background . The following facts are drawn from the allegations in the complaint, D. 2-3 at 5-13, and are assumed to be true for the purpose of considering the motion. Plaintiffs seek damages for Defendants' repeated low-altitude flights over their residence which, as alleged, last up to forty-five minutes, and generate noise and vibration and expose them to lead-based fuel particulate. D. 2-3 at 5. According to Plaintiffs, their efforts to seek relief have been met with retaliation, including pilots intentionally circling their residence. D. 2-3 at 8. Plaintiffs' assert claims of nuisance (Count I), negligent infliction of emotional distress (Count II), intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count III) and unfair and deceptive acts and practices under Mass. Gen. L. c. 93A (Count IV). D. 2-3 at 8-12. Discussion. Defendants removed this case on the basis that Plaintiffs' claims "implicate substantial federal questions, including the regulation of aircraft noise and air pollution under federal law, and are preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act (ADA)," "the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as amended (FAA)," "Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR's)" and "the Clean Air Act." D. 33 at 1; see D. 2. A state-court suit that includes at least one claim "arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States"can be removed to federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (allowing for removal of suits that fall within the federal district courts' original jurisdiction over federal-question cases); 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal-question statute). "[T]he question whether a claim 'arises under' federal law must be determined by reference to the 'well-pleaded complaint.' A defense that raises a federal question is inadequate to confer federal jurisdiction." Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson , 478 U.S. 804, 808 (1986) (citations omitted); see Rivet v. Regions Bank of La. , 522 U.S. 470, 475 (1998) (explaining that a "case may not be removed to federal court on the basis of a federal defense... even if the defense is anticipated in the plaintiff's complaint, and even if both parties admit that the defense is the only question truly at issue in the case") (citation omitted). Defendants insist that Plaintiffs' claims are "grounded upon the Defendants' failure to comply with FAA regulations of aircraft operations, noise generated by engines and propellers subject to certification by the FAA and alleged pollution which is also governed by federal law." D. 33 at 8. This does not necessarily appear to be the case, where Plaintiffs' complaint stems not from the mechanics of the aircrafts, but instead from how they are flown. D. 2-3 at 5-12. Nor does the FAA create a private right of action or evince any attempt to preempt state law remedies. See D. 24-1 at 6-7; Abdullah v. Am. Airlines, Inc. , 181 F.3d 363, 375 (3d Cir. 1999) (noting that "it is evident in both the savings and the insurance clauses of the FAA that Congress found state damage remedies to be compatible with federal aviation safety standards"). This case is, therefore, distinguishable from City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal Inc. , 411 U.S. 624, 633 (1973) where "the Supreme Court held that the City of Burbank could not use municipal curfews to impose noise regulations on aircraft operations." Gustafson v. City of Lake Angelus , 76 F.3d 778, 783 (6th Cir. 1996) (distinguishing City of Burbank and holding that the FAA did not preempt city ordinances). Here, no state attempts to regulate aircraft noise. Instead, private parties seek damages for low altitude flights that they allege specifically target their residence. Defendants also point to City of Tipp City v. City of Dayton , 204 F.R.D. 388, 395 (S.D. Ohio 2001), in which a district court concluded that state law nuisance and tort claims related to airport departures which were brought by municipalities against a neighboring city were preempted by the FAA because they required the court to determine whether the city violated the FAA's Tower Orders. As Plaintiffs explain, however, they "do not allege that Defendants have violated any federal aviation standard, nor do they seek to enforce federal regulations." D. 36 at 2. Rather, they "assert a traditional state-law nuisance claim grounded in the harm caused by Defendants' tortuous conduct, irrespective of whether that conduct complies with or violates any federal directive." Id. Another session of this Court rejected similar arguments from the defendants in Casey v. Goulian , 273 F. Supp. 2d 136, 137 (D. Mass. 2003). There, defendants, pilots and an airport operator, had removed a state court complaint raising state-law nuisance claims arising from "noisy and dangerous stunt-airplane flights over their homes." Id. The court remanded the case to state court, noting that "the complaint itself [did] not contain any reference to the FAA or any other federal law" and "[e]ven if FAA statutory or regulatory standards did provide a required element of plaintiffs' state-law claims, defendants have failed to demonstrate that the FAA provides a private cause of action to enforce these standards." Id. at 138. According to the Casey court, "Congress, through the FAA, did not take the subject of airplane interference with property rights and give it exclusively to the federal courts." Id. at 140. This is the case here as well. Accordingly, the Court ALLOWS Plaintiffs' motion to vacate the removal of this case and remand to state court, D. 24, and, pursuant to L.R. 81.1(d), the Court will REMAND this case to the Middlesex Superior Court no sooner than thirty days. (LMH)