Isn't this all federally preempted?
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Short answer: No, not all issues are preempted; but a significant subset are, under certain doctrines of federal law.
The consensus view is: yes, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has exclusive authority over aviation safety and the “efficient use of the airspace” (i.e., the navigable airspace) in the United States, and in those fields state or local regulation is likely to be preempted. However, Congress did not enact a blanket preemption of all state/local regulation of aviation (including general aviation). The statutory scheme and case-law indicate that state regulation may survive if it does not intrude on the federally-occupied fields of safety/airspace efficiency or conflict with federal regulation. In the general aviation context, state law causes of action (e.g., product‐liability, tort/negligence) have not been entirely preempted, particularly when they do not attempt to impose different standards on design or operation of aircraft. The FAA (and Congress) has the power under the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (and its successor statutes) to regulate civil aviation for “safety in the air commerce” and “orderly development of … airspace” (among other things). |
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Field Preemption vs. Conflict Preemption vs. Express Preemption
General Aviation / State Law Causes of Action
In the general aviation (GA) context (i.e., non-airline, non-commercial air carriers), courts have been careful not to assume that all state law is preempted. For example, in one case the Washington Supreme Court held that common‐law product liability claims for a GA accident were not impliedly preempted because the FAA regulations did not show an intent to supplant state tort standards in that design area. As one commentator notes: “Congress neither established … that the FAA … set standards of care; instead it only authorized the agency to impose minimum standards.” Thus, the existence of minimum regulatory standards does not automatically demonstrate that Congress intended to oust state tort law.
State/Local Regulation of Land Use, Zoning, Noise, Takeoff/Landing
Some activities adjacent to aviation (airport land use, zoning, noise control, where take‐off/landing may occur) may fall within traditional state or local “police power” functions rather than pure safety/airspace regulation. Courts and commentaries suggest these may not be preempted provided they don’t interfere with aviation safety or airspace efficiency. For example: “Laws regulating land use can co-exist with federal aviation law … so long as neither their purpose nor their effect encroaches into the field of airspace management or safety.” The FAA Fact Sheet similarly states that laws regulating how aircraft are used (rather than where/when in the airspace) may be permissible if they don’t impair reasonable use of the airspace.
Bottom Line for General Aviation
If a state/local regulation tries to set standards for aircraft design, manufacture, operation, pilot certification, airspace management, or flight paths/altitudes in a way that intrudes on aviation safety or efficient airspace use, then it is likely preempted (field or conflict). But if a regulation concerns a matter traditionally reserved to state/local police powers (e.g., zoning airport property, local noise ordinances impacting GA operations, trespass/land‐use rules around airports) and does not interfere with FAA safety or airspace rules, then it may be not preempted. Importantly: the lack of an express broad preemption in the statute means state tort claims (including in GA) are not automatically off the table. They may proceed unless they conflict with federal law or intrude into an occupied field.
- Express preemption: Congress clearly states that state law is preempted. In aviation, there is a narrowly drawn express preemption in the Airline Deregulation Act (ADA) for “prices, routes, or services” of air carriers.
- Field preemption: Congress implicitly occupies a regulatory field so thoroughly that state regulation is displaced. The FAA says safety and airspace efficiency are fields it occupies exclusively.
- Conflict preemption: Even if the field is not entirely occupied, a state law may be preempted if it “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress” or if compliance with both federal and state is impossible.
General Aviation / State Law Causes of Action
In the general aviation (GA) context (i.e., non-airline, non-commercial air carriers), courts have been careful not to assume that all state law is preempted. For example, in one case the Washington Supreme Court held that common‐law product liability claims for a GA accident were not impliedly preempted because the FAA regulations did not show an intent to supplant state tort standards in that design area. As one commentator notes: “Congress neither established … that the FAA … set standards of care; instead it only authorized the agency to impose minimum standards.” Thus, the existence of minimum regulatory standards does not automatically demonstrate that Congress intended to oust state tort law.
State/Local Regulation of Land Use, Zoning, Noise, Takeoff/Landing
Some activities adjacent to aviation (airport land use, zoning, noise control, where take‐off/landing may occur) may fall within traditional state or local “police power” functions rather than pure safety/airspace regulation. Courts and commentaries suggest these may not be preempted provided they don’t interfere with aviation safety or airspace efficiency. For example: “Laws regulating land use can co-exist with federal aviation law … so long as neither their purpose nor their effect encroaches into the field of airspace management or safety.” The FAA Fact Sheet similarly states that laws regulating how aircraft are used (rather than where/when in the airspace) may be permissible if they don’t impair reasonable use of the airspace.
Bottom Line for General Aviation
If a state/local regulation tries to set standards for aircraft design, manufacture, operation, pilot certification, airspace management, or flight paths/altitudes in a way that intrudes on aviation safety or efficient airspace use, then it is likely preempted (field or conflict). But if a regulation concerns a matter traditionally reserved to state/local police powers (e.g., zoning airport property, local noise ordinances impacting GA operations, trespass/land‐use rules around airports) and does not interfere with FAA safety or airspace rules, then it may be not preempted. Importantly: the lack of an express broad preemption in the statute means state tort claims (including in GA) are not automatically off the table. They may proceed unless they conflict with federal law or intrude into an occupied field.
Wasn't the airport here first?
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It’s a common argument that you hear when someone complains about the noise arising from an airport or it’s operations - in fact, it’s probably the most common argument - and a dismissive one at that. However, just because a facility was established before surrounding development does not mean that it or its operators have unfettered licence to impose burdens on neighbouring communities without accountability. Noise, pollution, and safety concerns from airports impose measurable burdens on residents. These burdens can, raise stress, reduce property values, and affect health of neighboring
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residents, among other ill effects. Even the ubiquitous Aircraft Owner and Pilots Association (AOPA) admits that this is a poor argument, stating: “It does not matter if the airport ‘was here first.’ Now that it has neighbours, their concerns must be taken seriously.”
Airports and their operating contexts evolve: new flight paths come into being; airports and operations expand; traffic increases; new aircraft types are either developed or start using the airport (with different noise and emission profiles); and land use patterns around the airport change. The only way for the airport to prevent land use changes around the airport that might potentially come into conflict with airport use is to purchase sufficient land around the airport to prevent the conflict, as originally recommended in the 1938 Civil Aeronautics Act, as well as in many instances after. Most airports do not have the foresight or the funding to do this, so they must endeavor to be good neighbors and strive to exist in cooperation with surrounding communities.
Community health, quality of life, and property rights matter.
Community rights and welfare are not subordinate simply because an airport predates them. Federal regulation regarding airport projects requires involvement from potentially impacted communities as stakeholders. Federally-funded sound-insulation programs show that impacts exist, and require mitigation. Major projects such as location of a new airport, a runway extension, or other potentially significant impact requires environmental review. The “airport was here first” argument does not exempt these obligations. Planning guidance states that airports do have responsibilities for their externalities—thus, just because an airport has existed does not remove its obligation to manage its impacts.
The statement “the airport was here first” is an oversimplified and inadequate excuse for aviation or airport authorities to act without regard for surrounding communities. Prior occupation does not override planning law, community rights, protection of the public health, or ethical obligations. For an airport and its community to thrive together, the better approach is one of mutual respect, transparency, and mitigation of impacts—not a blunt assertion of historical entitlement.
Airports and their operating contexts evolve: new flight paths come into being; airports and operations expand; traffic increases; new aircraft types are either developed or start using the airport (with different noise and emission profiles); and land use patterns around the airport change. The only way for the airport to prevent land use changes around the airport that might potentially come into conflict with airport use is to purchase sufficient land around the airport to prevent the conflict, as originally recommended in the 1938 Civil Aeronautics Act, as well as in many instances after. Most airports do not have the foresight or the funding to do this, so they must endeavor to be good neighbors and strive to exist in cooperation with surrounding communities.
Community health, quality of life, and property rights matter.
Community rights and welfare are not subordinate simply because an airport predates them. Federal regulation regarding airport projects requires involvement from potentially impacted communities as stakeholders. Federally-funded sound-insulation programs show that impacts exist, and require mitigation. Major projects such as location of a new airport, a runway extension, or other potentially significant impact requires environmental review. The “airport was here first” argument does not exempt these obligations. Planning guidance states that airports do have responsibilities for their externalities—thus, just because an airport has existed does not remove its obligation to manage its impacts.
The statement “the airport was here first” is an oversimplified and inadequate excuse for aviation or airport authorities to act without regard for surrounding communities. Prior occupation does not override planning law, community rights, protection of the public health, or ethical obligations. For an airport and its community to thrive together, the better approach is one of mutual respect, transparency, and mitigation of impacts—not a blunt assertion of historical entitlement.
Are landing fees illegal?
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No.
Landing fees—charges imposed on aircraft for using an airport's runway and facilities—are a tool that general aviation (GA) airports can use to enhance both economic self-sufficiency and operational safety. Many GA airports rely heavily on federal or local subsidies, as they generate limited revenue compared to commercial airports. Implementing modest landing fees helps cover costs for maintenance, staffing, lighting, and infrastructure improvements; reduces dependency on public funding by creating a more sustainable revenue stream; encourages fair use of airport resources, particularly from frequent or transient users who may not contribute through other means (e.g., fuel purchases). |
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Implementing landing fees at GA airports—when done thoughtfully—can strengthen financial stability and fund essential safety improvements. This approach supports long-term sustainability while ensuring that airport operations remain safe, fair, and beneficial to both users and local communities.
Most importantly, despite many claims to the contrary, as long as landing fees are implemented in such a way, they are not illegal.
Read more about landing fees and airports that have implemented them here.
Most importantly, despite many claims to the contrary, as long as landing fees are implemented in such a way, they are not illegal.
Read more about landing fees and airports that have implemented them here.
Are touch and goes necessary? Can they be regulated?
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Touch-and-go operations—the repeated landing and immediate takeoff of an aircraft—are an essential part of pilot training and proficiency. They allow flight students and certified pilots to practice landings, approaches, and pattern work efficiently. From an aviation safety and regulatory standpoint, touch-and-go training is considered a core element of maintaining flight competency, especially for local general aviation (GA) airports that serve as training hubs.
However, there is debate among the aviation community about the necessity of touch-and-goes (at a certain volume and intensity). It goes without saying that pilots should have proficiency in both taking off |
and landing in an aircraft, but how they achieve that proficiency is an ongoing question. The use of touch-and-goes as a training technique also depends greatly on the location of the airport, and whether or not there are residential or other noise-sensitive areas immediately surrounding the airport.
In reality, repetitive low-altitude passes generate the majority of noise complaints at urban or suburban airports. Frequent circuit flying can increase emissions as well as contribute to perceived safety risk in dense neighborhoods. In instances where congested areas immediately surround an airport, touch-and-go operations are a clear safety hazard to local residents. The 1,000-foot minimum regulation over congested areas is designed to ensure safety by providing a buffer for errors. However, aircraft performing touch-and-go operations in an airport pattern frequently fly under this minimum, creating significant risks for residents. Continuous touch-and-go operations create congested flight patterns over residential areas, increasing the likelihood of accidents. This congestion extends the air traffic pattern around the airport and heightens safety risks for more residents. Additionally, it raises the likelihood of ATC errors and contributes to controller fatigue, which creates its own safety concerns and can add to the risk of a safety incident.
Touch-and-goes are not categorically required at every airport; rather, they are operationally necessary where pilot training is an airport’s core mission. The FAA does not mandate that every public-use airport allow unrestricted touch-and-go traffic, but it expects airport sponsors to maintain reasonable and non-discriminatory access for aeronautical activities. Many airports in populated areas strike a balance through voluntary noise abatement procedures, scheduling or quotas for training operations to spread impact, designated practice areas at less populated satellite airports, but these measures are voluntary and can create issues of their own.
Touch-and-go operations are functionally necessary for safe and effective pilot training, but not operationally mandatory at every airport. At airports encircled by dense residential zones, it is appropriate to manage—rather than prohibit—these operations through collaborative planning, noise mitigation, and scheduling controls.
This approach preserves the FAA’s safety and access goals while addressing local quality-of-life concerns, maintaining compliance with grant assurances on reasonable and non-discriminatory use.
In reality, repetitive low-altitude passes generate the majority of noise complaints at urban or suburban airports. Frequent circuit flying can increase emissions as well as contribute to perceived safety risk in dense neighborhoods. In instances where congested areas immediately surround an airport, touch-and-go operations are a clear safety hazard to local residents. The 1,000-foot minimum regulation over congested areas is designed to ensure safety by providing a buffer for errors. However, aircraft performing touch-and-go operations in an airport pattern frequently fly under this minimum, creating significant risks for residents. Continuous touch-and-go operations create congested flight patterns over residential areas, increasing the likelihood of accidents. This congestion extends the air traffic pattern around the airport and heightens safety risks for more residents. Additionally, it raises the likelihood of ATC errors and contributes to controller fatigue, which creates its own safety concerns and can add to the risk of a safety incident.
Touch-and-goes are not categorically required at every airport; rather, they are operationally necessary where pilot training is an airport’s core mission. The FAA does not mandate that every public-use airport allow unrestricted touch-and-go traffic, but it expects airport sponsors to maintain reasonable and non-discriminatory access for aeronautical activities. Many airports in populated areas strike a balance through voluntary noise abatement procedures, scheduling or quotas for training operations to spread impact, designated practice areas at less populated satellite airports, but these measures are voluntary and can create issues of their own.
Touch-and-go operations are functionally necessary for safe and effective pilot training, but not operationally mandatory at every airport. At airports encircled by dense residential zones, it is appropriate to manage—rather than prohibit—these operations through collaborative planning, noise mitigation, and scheduling controls.
This approach preserves the FAA’s safety and access goals while addressing local quality-of-life concerns, maintaining compliance with grant assurances on reasonable and non-discriminatory use.
Is lead pollution from airplanes really a problem?
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Yes, this is a serious problem with serious human and wildlife health impacts. Lead dust from aviation fuel is extremely harmful.
It can no longer be denied that lead pollution from planes is a public health and environmental crisis, despite attempts by aviation proponents to cast doubt and delay. Not all planes use leaded fuel, but the small piston-engine planes that use local airports still do. A link between regional airport traffic and the blood lead levels of children living nearby was scientifically established in the 2021 study of the impacts from Reid-Hillview airport in Santa Clara County, CA. The peer-reviewed study found that children living downwind from the Reid-Hillview airport had higher blood lead levels, with increases of .40 micrograms per deciliter, over children living upwind from the airport. For context, lead levels detected during the peak of the Flint Water Crisis were between .35 and .45 micrograms per deciliter over baseline. However, Flint Michigan immediately stopped resident exposure to lead-contaminated drinking water and has since replaced the lead-lined pipes. In contrast, exposure to lead from aviation fuel continues unabated at small airports around the United States, and there is no plan or timetable for banning leaded aviation fuel. |
In October of 2023, the U.S. EPA issued an endangerment finding stating that “emissions of lead from aircraft that operate on leaded fuel cause or contribute to air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health and welfare under the Clean Air Act.” According to the World Health Organization, “The neurological and behavioral effects of lead are believed to be irreversible. There is no known safe blood lead concentration.”
“When it comes to our children the science is clear, exposure to lead can cause irreversible and life-long health effects,” said EPA Administrator Michael S. Regan. “Aircraft that use leaded fuel are the dominant source of lead emissions to air in the country.”
95% of the lead in aviation fuel is emitted on burning, and the resulting nanoparticles are too small to be easily filtered by pollution control devices. The tiny size of these particles makes them particularly absorbable by and toxic to living tissue.
Lead is a known serious health risk to all animal and human life. Exposure to lead is particularly harmful to young children and pregnant women. Lead exposure can cause lifelong disadvantages for children and developing fetuses. It leads to lower IQ and has been linked to antisocial behavior as well as reproductive, heart, and other health problems.
“When it comes to our children the science is clear, exposure to lead can cause irreversible and life-long health effects,” said EPA Administrator Michael S. Regan. “Aircraft that use leaded fuel are the dominant source of lead emissions to air in the country.”
95% of the lead in aviation fuel is emitted on burning, and the resulting nanoparticles are too small to be easily filtered by pollution control devices. The tiny size of these particles makes them particularly absorbable by and toxic to living tissue.
Lead is a known serious health risk to all animal and human life. Exposure to lead is particularly harmful to young children and pregnant women. Lead exposure can cause lifelong disadvantages for children and developing fetuses. It leads to lower IQ and has been linked to antisocial behavior as well as reproductive, heart, and other health problems.
Is it true that leaded fuel is going to be phased out?
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It will be a very long time before leaded aviation fuel is truly gone, if ever.
The FAA currently has no plan and no timetable for phasing out or banning leaded fuel. The recent EPA endangerment finding does not compel action by the FAA. In the 25 years since lead was banned from automotive fuel, the FAA has tried and failed to provide unleaded aviation fuel, so their record is not good. And, providing unleaded fuel is not the same as phasing out leaded fuel. The truth is that unless and until there is a nationwide ban on leaded aviation fuel, some planes flying in and out of airports like ours will be burning leaded fuel over our heads. |
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At the time of this writing (January 2024), use of unleaded aviation fuel is purely voluntary. Our airport may be able to obtain and sell unleaded fuel, but the FAA requires BDU to also continue to sell leaded fuel. Unleaded fuel costs about $1 to $1.50 more per gallon than leaded fuel. You
can imagine pulling up to the gas pump and seeing the cheap fuel next to the fuel that costs an additional $1 or more per gallon. How many pilots will choose the more expensive unleaded fuel, when many of them still deny that lead is a problem?
At airports where unleaded fuel is currently available for small piston-engine planes, sales are low. This means nearly all planes flying in and out of small airports like ours are still buying and using leaded fuel.
What’s more, the aviation industry continues to this day to advocate for the continued use of leaded fuel because it is cheaper and available nationwide for all fleets. Any switch to unleaded fuel will be slow and incomplete for as long as leaded fuel is still an option. The aviation industry
will fight fiercely against any ban.
can imagine pulling up to the gas pump and seeing the cheap fuel next to the fuel that costs an additional $1 or more per gallon. How many pilots will choose the more expensive unleaded fuel, when many of them still deny that lead is a problem?
At airports where unleaded fuel is currently available for small piston-engine planes, sales are low. This means nearly all planes flying in and out of small airports like ours are still buying and using leaded fuel.
What’s more, the aviation industry continues to this day to advocate for the continued use of leaded fuel because it is cheaper and available nationwide for all fleets. Any switch to unleaded fuel will be slow and incomplete for as long as leaded fuel is still an option. The aviation industry
will fight fiercely against any ban.
Is it true that there is a pilot shortage?
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In recent years, many reports and industry voices have warned of a looming or present “pilot shortage” in commercial aviation—essentially the idea that there are not enough qualified pilots available to meet airlines’ hiring needs. For example, some flight-school and training sources claim large numbers of pilots will be needed in the next decade as air travel grows.
However, many analysts and pilot-union voices challenge this narrative, arguing that the shortage is either exaggerated, mischaracterized, or driven by other factors. For instance, the Air Line Pilots Association, International (ALPA) states that in the U.S., there is a surplus of certified pilots rather than a shortage, noting that for each pilot needed there are approximately 1.5 pilots certified. According to the Air Line Pilots Association, Int’l (ALPA) on September 12, 2023, “As special interests in Washington continue their campaign of misinformation about pilot supply, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has released its latest pilot-production data showing that the United States is outperforming last year’s record-breaking year with 10,091 new airline pilots certificated in the past 12 |
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months. More than 1,200 new pilots were produced in August alone of this year, the largest monthly number ever. Overall, there are 6,500 more pilots today compared to before the pandemic according to data from the Department of Transportation and airline filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission.” In Europe, the European Cockpit Association (ECA) reports that pilot supply has for years exceeded the number of available jobs and the shortage narrative may serve to push regulatory changes.
So, how did the myth arise and what’s really going on? Some of the hype around a “shortage” comes from delays, costs, or barriers in training new pilots. For example, the U.S. “1500-hour rule” (which requires 1,500 hours of flight time for an Airline Transport Pilot certificate) is often cited as constraining the pipeline. Even though many pilots are certified, they might not meet the specific experience, hours, or airline-type requirements to be hired. That suggests the problem may be more about which pilots airlines want, and under what pay/conditions, rather than absolute numbers of pilots.
Some voices argue that the shortage narrative is deployed by airlines or training organizations to justify weaker safety/training standards, lower pay, or changes in regulation. For instance, ALPA argues that airlines use the shortage claim to weaken rules and cut costs.
Overall, the metrics are muddy; having a certificate doesn’t mean the pilot is actively flying, wants the job, or meets the airline’s requirements. Often times the certificates are pilots who are merely flying as hobbyists. Some reports suggest a future gap (e.g., thousands of new pilots needed by 2030), though those are just projections and depend heavily on fleet growth and retirement rates. However, other data show stable or declining numbers in certain categories of pilots, which complicates a simple “shortage” label.
In short: The myth—or at least the oversimplified version—of the “pilot shortage” is the claim that there simply aren’t enough qualified pilots to meet airline hiring demand. While in some segments shortage-like conditions may exist, the broad brush “we have no pilots” claim lacks support across all geographies and airline categories. This claim is often used to justify the ‘emergency’ and to run roughshod over the rights of the communities that find themselves adversely impacted by training operations - if there is no actual pilot shortage, it may be time to re-balance the rights and needs of all impacted parties after years of imbalance.
So, how did the myth arise and what’s really going on? Some of the hype around a “shortage” comes from delays, costs, or barriers in training new pilots. For example, the U.S. “1500-hour rule” (which requires 1,500 hours of flight time for an Airline Transport Pilot certificate) is often cited as constraining the pipeline. Even though many pilots are certified, they might not meet the specific experience, hours, or airline-type requirements to be hired. That suggests the problem may be more about which pilots airlines want, and under what pay/conditions, rather than absolute numbers of pilots.
Some voices argue that the shortage narrative is deployed by airlines or training organizations to justify weaker safety/training standards, lower pay, or changes in regulation. For instance, ALPA argues that airlines use the shortage claim to weaken rules and cut costs.
Overall, the metrics are muddy; having a certificate doesn’t mean the pilot is actively flying, wants the job, or meets the airline’s requirements. Often times the certificates are pilots who are merely flying as hobbyists. Some reports suggest a future gap (e.g., thousands of new pilots needed by 2030), though those are just projections and depend heavily on fleet growth and retirement rates. However, other data show stable or declining numbers in certain categories of pilots, which complicates a simple “shortage” label.
In short: The myth—or at least the oversimplified version—of the “pilot shortage” is the claim that there simply aren’t enough qualified pilots to meet airline hiring demand. While in some segments shortage-like conditions may exist, the broad brush “we have no pilots” claim lacks support across all geographies and airline categories. This claim is often used to justify the ‘emergency’ and to run roughshod over the rights of the communities that find themselves adversely impacted by training operations - if there is no actual pilot shortage, it may be time to re-balance the rights and needs of all impacted parties after years of imbalance.
What about the airport's economic impact?
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The Economic Impact Reports often referred to and promulgated by aviation enthusiasts are not a reflection of actual economic impact, but instead propaganda designed to promote continued investment in aviation resources, often to the detriment of the surrounding communities. The truth is, most airports are not economically self-sufficient and rely on grants from federal and state sources, as well as subsidies from local governments and the airport sponsors in order to make ends meet. This could be viewed as an opportunity cost for communities that might otherwise utilize some of these funds for projects that benefit a wider slice of the community.
From a financial perspective, it can be hard to justify most general aviation airports airport as an “asset.” Many have consistent budget shortfalls for the airport and a lack of capital reserves, meaning the airport operates in the red and relies on taxpayer dollars to stay open, no matter what state or what their source of funding. All flight enthusiasm aside, the airports are in reality more of an economic |
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liability. Additionally, any revenue derived from the airport is required by federal law to be spent on the airport itself, so any gains from revenue would not flow back into general funds, so the actual airport is prohibited by law from directly contributing to a community’s revenue coffers. Whatever economic ‘impact’ there is, it is indirect, and thus harder to measure (and easier to exaggerate).
Because almost all airports depend on FAA and state and local grants for operations and improvements, those grants restrict the airport proprietor’s control over adjacent land use and require the airport to remain open for at least 20 years from receipt of the last grant—or potentially indefinitely, depending on how the funds were used. Grant assurances guarantee one thing: the municipality or entity that owns the airport doesn’t control it.
Best practice dictates that all airport proprietors should have purchased all of the land surrounding the airport to provide a buffer for the inherent liability that an airport creates by its presence and operations. Any liabilities incurred by airport activity, such as nuisance, noise, and low-flights in areas that do not have avigation easements also pose a financial risk to the proprietor, and in most cases, the taxpayer who does not benefit from the airport in any way. That is a potential cost that is likely never taken into account in these calculations of ‘economic impact’, but the potential liability costs are real.
There is another side of the economic question that is rarely taken into account, and that is: what is the true cost of airport activity to the surrounding community? This question is essential to bring balance and fairness to the development of aviation resources. Community members regularly hear about the beneficial economic effect, in terms of jobs and revenue generated, but missing from these analyses is a measure of the cost to the surrounding communities for these operations, such as deteriorating property values, negative impacts on health and learning, reduction in the quality of life, etc. There is also the not insignificant consideration of the fact that communities surrounding airports are significantly affected by health care costs associated with noise from these facilities.
Who pays for the health care required as a result of airport noise? Much of it is public money. According to the US Census Bureau, 33.7% of the population are covered by public health care plans. That means that public money is being used to mitigate the adverse health impact of airport noise and, therefore, should be counted as a source of public funds for these small regional airports.
All of this begs the question: If these airports are such economic engines, why do they have to be subsidized by the general funds, and state and federal grants? Why are most of them not listed as major employers in the areas in which they are located? Airports should make public an accurate profit and loss statement and see the real value of these assets.
What would it take for the airport to benefit the whole community? Those who benefit from the airport now are those who benefit from the airport not changing.
Because almost all airports depend on FAA and state and local grants for operations and improvements, those grants restrict the airport proprietor’s control over adjacent land use and require the airport to remain open for at least 20 years from receipt of the last grant—or potentially indefinitely, depending on how the funds were used. Grant assurances guarantee one thing: the municipality or entity that owns the airport doesn’t control it.
Best practice dictates that all airport proprietors should have purchased all of the land surrounding the airport to provide a buffer for the inherent liability that an airport creates by its presence and operations. Any liabilities incurred by airport activity, such as nuisance, noise, and low-flights in areas that do not have avigation easements also pose a financial risk to the proprietor, and in most cases, the taxpayer who does not benefit from the airport in any way. That is a potential cost that is likely never taken into account in these calculations of ‘economic impact’, but the potential liability costs are real.
There is another side of the economic question that is rarely taken into account, and that is: what is the true cost of airport activity to the surrounding community? This question is essential to bring balance and fairness to the development of aviation resources. Community members regularly hear about the beneficial economic effect, in terms of jobs and revenue generated, but missing from these analyses is a measure of the cost to the surrounding communities for these operations, such as deteriorating property values, negative impacts on health and learning, reduction in the quality of life, etc. There is also the not insignificant consideration of the fact that communities surrounding airports are significantly affected by health care costs associated with noise from these facilities.
Who pays for the health care required as a result of airport noise? Much of it is public money. According to the US Census Bureau, 33.7% of the population are covered by public health care plans. That means that public money is being used to mitigate the adverse health impact of airport noise and, therefore, should be counted as a source of public funds for these small regional airports.
All of this begs the question: If these airports are such economic engines, why do they have to be subsidized by the general funds, and state and federal grants? Why are most of them not listed as major employers in the areas in which they are located? Airports should make public an accurate profit and loss statement and see the real value of these assets.
What would it take for the airport to benefit the whole community? Those who benefit from the airport now are those who benefit from the airport not changing.
What about the flight schools?
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Or, are flight schools necessary for addressing the pilot shortage? Not all of them.
Part 61 GA-airport flight schools are great for general aviation and recreational pilots. But if the goal is solving the airline pilot pipeline, Part 141 university programs and military pathways are more efficient, standardized, and professionally aligned—and they produce far more career-track pilots per training hour and per community impact. The narrative that simply expanding flight schools will solve the pilot shortage is overly simplistic. The greatest bottleneck in pilot development isn’t initial flight training capacity—it’s the long, costly, and selective pipeline beyond the private pilot certificate. Many |
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student pilots never continue to commercial-level qualifications due to financial barriers, the 1,500-hour requirement, or attrition during advanced training stages. Flight schools primarily generate large numbers of new student pilots, but historically only a fraction complete the professional track, meaning expanding flight schools largely expands dropout and hobbyist pipelines rather than the professional workforce.
Part 141 schools and military programs operate under highly structured syllabi approved by the FAA. Training is standardized, progress is formally tracked, and curriculum quality is monitored. Part 61 training is flexible and informal—great for hobby pilots, but less efficient for producing consistent airline-ready aviators. This is why 141 pilots can qualify for airline jobs with fewer flight hours (1,000–1,250 vs. 1,500).
Military and Part 141 programs attract candidates specifically pursuing professional aviation, and they’re designed to carry students all the way through commercial and instrument ratings. By contrast, most Part 61 schools at small GA airports serve a mixed population where a large percentage of students stop after the private pilot certificate or fly recreationally. That means more community noise and air-traffic impact without reliably producing commercial-track pilots.
Part 141 and military programs typically use full-motion simulators, advanced avionics and standardized fleets, Dedicated training airspace, and professional ground-school facilities. They also tend to have dedicated training areas, parallel runways, some sort of towered or monitored environment, and robust noise abatement procedures. If the argument is that the purpose of flight training and the inconvenience and nuisance that it creates for people on the ground is necessary for the purpose of addressing the pilot shortage, this pathway is a clearer more efficient path towards that goal, with much more consideration to impact on people to the ground, as well as higher yield on competent flight-ready pilots. They have higher completion rates and direct pathways into airlines. In other words, they produce career pilots far more efficiently, without creating the same level of community disruption.
Part 61 programs often operate from small community airports with limited facilities, older aircraft, and less institutional support. For the most part, the impact to the communities stems from Part 61 programs (although not exclusively) - all flight training has an impact on the communities that surround airports that they operate from when flight training facilities are located at airports that are surrounded by densely-populated residential areas. Flight training at small GA airports can place disproportionate noise, safety, and congestion pressures on surrounding communities for comparatively low commercial pilot yield.
If the goal is to address a pilot shortage, the solution isn’t simply adding more small airport flight schools. It’s investing in programs that deliver professional pilots: structured pathways, financial support, and partnerships with airlines.
Addressing a pilot shortage requires structured career pipelines, financial support, and improved working conditions—not just more local flight traffic. Investing in professional pilot pathways, simulator-based training, and airline-backed programs is a more efficient and community-responsible strategy than assuming every flight school expansion equates to more airline pilots. As a community, we need to weigh the real benefits of flight school expansions against the local impacts. Let’s focus on solutions that actually produce career pilots, not just more local aircraft movements.
Part 141 schools and military programs operate under highly structured syllabi approved by the FAA. Training is standardized, progress is formally tracked, and curriculum quality is monitored. Part 61 training is flexible and informal—great for hobby pilots, but less efficient for producing consistent airline-ready aviators. This is why 141 pilots can qualify for airline jobs with fewer flight hours (1,000–1,250 vs. 1,500).
Military and Part 141 programs attract candidates specifically pursuing professional aviation, and they’re designed to carry students all the way through commercial and instrument ratings. By contrast, most Part 61 schools at small GA airports serve a mixed population where a large percentage of students stop after the private pilot certificate or fly recreationally. That means more community noise and air-traffic impact without reliably producing commercial-track pilots.
Part 141 and military programs typically use full-motion simulators, advanced avionics and standardized fleets, Dedicated training airspace, and professional ground-school facilities. They also tend to have dedicated training areas, parallel runways, some sort of towered or monitored environment, and robust noise abatement procedures. If the argument is that the purpose of flight training and the inconvenience and nuisance that it creates for people on the ground is necessary for the purpose of addressing the pilot shortage, this pathway is a clearer more efficient path towards that goal, with much more consideration to impact on people to the ground, as well as higher yield on competent flight-ready pilots. They have higher completion rates and direct pathways into airlines. In other words, they produce career pilots far more efficiently, without creating the same level of community disruption.
Part 61 programs often operate from small community airports with limited facilities, older aircraft, and less institutional support. For the most part, the impact to the communities stems from Part 61 programs (although not exclusively) - all flight training has an impact on the communities that surround airports that they operate from when flight training facilities are located at airports that are surrounded by densely-populated residential areas. Flight training at small GA airports can place disproportionate noise, safety, and congestion pressures on surrounding communities for comparatively low commercial pilot yield.
If the goal is to address a pilot shortage, the solution isn’t simply adding more small airport flight schools. It’s investing in programs that deliver professional pilots: structured pathways, financial support, and partnerships with airlines.
Addressing a pilot shortage requires structured career pipelines, financial support, and improved working conditions—not just more local flight traffic. Investing in professional pilot pathways, simulator-based training, and airline-backed programs is a more efficient and community-responsible strategy than assuming every flight school expansion equates to more airline pilots. As a community, we need to weigh the real benefits of flight school expansions against the local impacts. Let’s focus on solutions that actually produce career pilots, not just more local aircraft movements.
Aren't the flight schools all training tomorrow's pilots?
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If you walk into a flight school and track the outcome of 100 people who start flight training, industry evidence and surveys suggest only about 20–30 of them will finish a pilot certificate; of those, only a small fraction (single to low 10%) will continue to commercial or ATP levels with the intent of a professional flying career. The rest remain hobbyists or stop flying.
Most people who start flight training do so for recreational or hobbyist reasons.A large share of people who begin training either stop before earning any certificate, or finish at the private/sport/recreational level |
- these represent the vast majority of completed pilot certificates. The FAA’s 2024 civil airmen statistics show ~848,770 active pilot certificates (end of CY2024) with a substantial increase in student pilot certificates (student count increased to ~345,495 in 2024). Student and private certificates dominate the population compared with the ATP/commercial categories.
Of those who do start training with the intention of moving past their initial certification, there are concerning figures that affect that outcome. AOPA’s own figures show an overall dropout rate between 70-80% between starting the training process and completion of a certificate beyond the earliest stages. The practical meaning: only about 20–30% of prospective students who begin training reach an initial level of pilot certificate, let alone achieve certification beyond that level.
A small fraction of all people who train to become pilots go on to achieve their commercial or ATIP certification. The FAA’s numbers show tens of thousands of total pilot certificates issued each year, but only roughly ten thousand or so ATP certificates per year in recent years, where there have been more pilots training than ever, thanks to the so-called ‘pilot shortage’. 2023 saw record pilot production overall, but ALPA noted 11,225 ATP certificates in 2023 — far smaller than the counts of student/private certificates issued that same year. Meaning, only a small percentage of trainees end up on the professional training track.
Of those who do start training with the intention of moving past their initial certification, there are concerning figures that affect that outcome. AOPA’s own figures show an overall dropout rate between 70-80% between starting the training process and completion of a certificate beyond the earliest stages. The practical meaning: only about 20–30% of prospective students who begin training reach an initial level of pilot certificate, let alone achieve certification beyond that level.
A small fraction of all people who train to become pilots go on to achieve their commercial or ATIP certification. The FAA’s numbers show tens of thousands of total pilot certificates issued each year, but only roughly ten thousand or so ATP certificates per year in recent years, where there have been more pilots training than ever, thanks to the so-called ‘pilot shortage’. 2023 saw record pilot production overall, but ALPA noted 11,225 ATP certificates in 2023 — far smaller than the counts of student/private certificates issued that same year. Meaning, only a small percentage of trainees end up on the professional training track.
Can't they institute curfews?
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Curfews at airports are not broadly open for arbitrary adoption. They are legally permissible but typically only if the airport: is grandfathered from pre‐ANCA restrictions; follows the strict Part 161 process and gets approval; or implements voluntary (non-mandatory) measures for GA use. In reality - this doesn’t happen.
Under the Airport Noise and Capacity Act of 1990 (ANCA) and its implementing rules (14 CFR Part 161), new access or use restrictions at airports that receive federal funds cannot be imposed unless a |
prospective applicant completes a Part 161 “Notice and Approval of Airport Noise and Access Restrictions” process and obtains FAA approval. Many public‐use airports that accept federal grants must keep themselves “open for public use on reasonable terms” due to grant assurance obligations. Thus, imposing a blanket curfew that prohibits operations by certain users may violate those assurances.
For airports that are not grandfathered, curfews are extremely difficult to justify and get approved because of the economic and access implications. For commercial airline operations, full curfews are extremely rare unless previously established. For general aviation, there is more flexibility (especially for noise mitigation), but still subject to federal obligations if the airport is a federally‐obligated public‐use facility.
For airports that are not grandfathered, curfews are extremely difficult to justify and get approved because of the economic and access implications. For commercial airline operations, full curfews are extremely rare unless previously established. For general aviation, there is more flexibility (especially for noise mitigation), but still subject to federal obligations if the airport is a federally‐obligated public‐use facility.
What about electric planes?
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Electric Planes Will Not Solve the Immediate Airport Issues
Could electric planes solve our noise and lead pollution problems from planes flying over a community’s homes, schools, parks? Maybe, if you live long enough to see it happen. Don’t be fooled by those that say that electric planes are the solution to today’s noise and pollution issues that stem from frequent, low-flying operations in areas near (and in some cases, far from) predominantly general aviation airports. The reality is, replacing these planes is a long way out. Even if they are approved by the FAA tomorrow, the first models to roll off the line won’t replace all of the country’s existing general aviation aircraft fleet - the average single-engine piston plane in the United States is over 50 years old. These small, private piston engine planes using the airspace over neighborhoods are the cause of most of the nuisance and frustration experienced by residents today. Some aviation advocates, public |
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officials and aspiring local politicians point to the promise of electric planes as the solution to this issue, but such an assertion is simply incorrect. Electric planes sound promising, but when considering the technological advancements and many millions needed to get infrastructure in place, combined with most general aviation airport’s budgetary shortcomings and limited ability to generate revenue, most communities won’t see electric planes taking over the sky anytime soon.
Technology adoption rates are almost always significantly overly optimistic and the adoption of electric planes is likely much slower than most other technologies. 1.4% of today’s automotive fleet on the roads in the US are fully electric, and that's with significant government subsidies and 35 years of evangelization towards their adoption.
Yes, the average age of non-electric general aviation planes (including propeller driven planes) in the US is over 50 years. Most private planes are for recreation, and owners have no real incentive to get rid of their old hobby airplanes. Unlike automobiles, these small planes are not subject to emissions checks, insurance requirements, or any other concerns that eventually drive older cars off of the roads. For many pilots, the love of old airplanes and the cost of new ones means that the changeover will be slow, and it’s doubtful that electric aircraft will ever fully replace the avgas-driven fleet.
As for electric aircraft being touted as the solution for noise issues, plane noise is a function of propellers as much as it is engines, so unless these electric planes use three or four blades instead of the standard two, it won't make much of a difference to those on the ground. Yes, the engines are quieter, but the propellers are more expensive, and given that 3 or 4 bladed propellers are a solution that are available to much of the aviation fleet today as a noise-reduction strategy with limited uptake, the idea that this will change with electric engines seems hopeful, at best.
If there was a high adoption rate for electric planes, there are issues of logistics. If there are only chargers at one airport, and the current flight time on a charged plane is 60-90 minutes, the aircraft will only have enough time to fly around the airport, which only compounds a community’s problems. Without a network of infrastructure, they won't be able to go anywhere else, and for reasons of safety and practicality will be limited in their range. Full adoption of universally-compatible charging infrastructure will be necessary for these aircraft to move about freely, at a great economic and logistical cost. Who will bear the burden of paying for these charging stations?
Though undoubtedly electric planes represent a portion of aviation’s future, they are not a panacea to the issues of noise pollution and nuisance, have their own significant infrastructure costs and concerns; and will simply add an additional mode to the nation’s aviation transportation dynamics. Read more about the developments in electric aircraft here, and here.
Technology adoption rates are almost always significantly overly optimistic and the adoption of electric planes is likely much slower than most other technologies. 1.4% of today’s automotive fleet on the roads in the US are fully electric, and that's with significant government subsidies and 35 years of evangelization towards their adoption.
Yes, the average age of non-electric general aviation planes (including propeller driven planes) in the US is over 50 years. Most private planes are for recreation, and owners have no real incentive to get rid of their old hobby airplanes. Unlike automobiles, these small planes are not subject to emissions checks, insurance requirements, or any other concerns that eventually drive older cars off of the roads. For many pilots, the love of old airplanes and the cost of new ones means that the changeover will be slow, and it’s doubtful that electric aircraft will ever fully replace the avgas-driven fleet.
As for electric aircraft being touted as the solution for noise issues, plane noise is a function of propellers as much as it is engines, so unless these electric planes use three or four blades instead of the standard two, it won't make much of a difference to those on the ground. Yes, the engines are quieter, but the propellers are more expensive, and given that 3 or 4 bladed propellers are a solution that are available to much of the aviation fleet today as a noise-reduction strategy with limited uptake, the idea that this will change with electric engines seems hopeful, at best.
If there was a high adoption rate for electric planes, there are issues of logistics. If there are only chargers at one airport, and the current flight time on a charged plane is 60-90 minutes, the aircraft will only have enough time to fly around the airport, which only compounds a community’s problems. Without a network of infrastructure, they won't be able to go anywhere else, and for reasons of safety and practicality will be limited in their range. Full adoption of universally-compatible charging infrastructure will be necessary for these aircraft to move about freely, at a great economic and logistical cost. Who will bear the burden of paying for these charging stations?
Though undoubtedly electric planes represent a portion of aviation’s future, they are not a panacea to the issues of noise pollution and nuisance, have their own significant infrastructure costs and concerns; and will simply add an additional mode to the nation’s aviation transportation dynamics. Read more about the developments in electric aircraft here, and here.
What are Grant Assurances?
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The FAA Grant Assurances are a set of legally binding commitments that airports make to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) when they accept federal funds through the Airport Improvement Program (AIP). These assurances ensure that airports use federal grant money properly and continue to operate safely, efficiently, and without unjust discrimination.
When an airport accepts FAA funding, it agrees to a series of grant assurances—rules that protect the public’s investment and uphold national aviation standards. These assurances cover areas like maintaining the airport safely and open to all types of aeronautical |
users, using airport revenue only for aviation purposes, preventing exclusive rights for specific operators, maintaining fair rates, and complying with environmental and civil rights laws. Essentially, they ensure that airports funded by federal money remain accessible, well-maintained, and operated in the public interest for decades after the grant is received.
FAA grant assurances are binding commitments, but they are not absolute. The FAA allows measured, case-specific flexibility—as long as the airport demonstrates that public access, safety, and federal investment are protected. The FAA’s flexibility focuses on reasonableness, documentation, and preserving public benefit. Airports can deviate from strict terms only when they prove it won’t harm aviation access, safety, or federal investment.
FAA grant assurances are binding commitments, but they are not absolute. The FAA allows measured, case-specific flexibility—as long as the airport demonstrates that public access, safety, and federal investment are protected. The FAA’s flexibility focuses on reasonableness, documentation, and preserving public benefit. Airports can deviate from strict terms only when they prove it won’t harm aviation access, safety, or federal investment.
What is Metroplex?
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The FAA’s Metroplex program is part of the broader NextGen modernization initiative to improve air traffic flow in major metropolitan regions with multiple busy airports close together. These “metroplexes” — such as Southern California, Atlanta, Washington D.C., and Northern California — historically relied on older ground-based navigation routes and traditional traffic patterns that caused congestion, delays, and inefficient flight paths. The program was designed to make air traffic more efficient by using new GPS-based routes. In theory, this means smoother climbs and descents, more direct paths, and fewer delays. On paper, that sounds like an improvement for everyone.
However, while Metroplex was said to improve efficiency for airlines, it also concentrates flights over specific neighborhoods instead of spreading them out. That has led to more noise for some |
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communities, even if overall flight operations haven’t increased. Flight paths over specific neighborhoods that had never experienced this level of aviation noise before; instead of spreading aircraft out across wider areas like the old system did, planes now follow very narrow, precise corridors. That means the same households and parks, schools, and neighborhoods get flown over again and again, sometimes hundreds of times a day. The consistency and concentration of these routes has dramatically amplified the impact for the people under them. In many places, aircraft also fly lower for longer stretches, which further increases noise.
Additionally, the federal government’s own oversight office, the Department of Transportation Inspector General, has said that the program has fallen short in major ways. First, the expected benefits didn’t materialize. The OIG found that the fuel savings and efficiency gains were significantly lower than what the FAA originally promised. In some cases, aircraft actually ended up flying longer or less efficient paths than forecast. Second, Metroplex was delayed and poorly managed. Many sites ran years behind schedule because critical issues — like controller tools, procedure changes, and training — were not resolved before rollout. The OIG called out a lack of planning, lack of documentation, and a failure to track key problems. Third, and most important for residents here, noise impacts were not adequately considered. Metroplex concentrated flight paths over narrow corridors, putting constant air traffic over neighborhoods that weren’t historically impacted. This has sparked lawsuits and backlash across the country — from Phoenix to Northern California — because communities were blindsided and meaningful engagement did not occur.
The OIG found the FAA relied heavily on judgment rather than transparent, data-based analysis, and that noise and environmental reviews used outdated standards that failed to reflect real community impact. The result has been a nationwide pattern: from Phoenix to Northern California to Washington, D.C., communities have seen steep rises in noise complaints, lawsuits, and demands for updated FAA standards and real community engagement. These reactions are not about opposition to aviation — it’s about ensuring modernization doesn’t come at the expense of public health and quality of life. People deserve meaningful notice, real participation in route planning, and updated noise standards that reflect today’s flight patterns, not those from decades ago.
In short: the FAA promised big benefits, but delivered less efficiency than expected, significant community harm, and a process that lacked transparency and accountability. Going forward, we need the FAA to modernize its noise standards, fully consider community health and livability, and include the public as real partners — not an afterthought — in airspace decisions.
Additionally, the federal government’s own oversight office, the Department of Transportation Inspector General, has said that the program has fallen short in major ways. First, the expected benefits didn’t materialize. The OIG found that the fuel savings and efficiency gains were significantly lower than what the FAA originally promised. In some cases, aircraft actually ended up flying longer or less efficient paths than forecast. Second, Metroplex was delayed and poorly managed. Many sites ran years behind schedule because critical issues — like controller tools, procedure changes, and training — were not resolved before rollout. The OIG called out a lack of planning, lack of documentation, and a failure to track key problems. Third, and most important for residents here, noise impacts were not adequately considered. Metroplex concentrated flight paths over narrow corridors, putting constant air traffic over neighborhoods that weren’t historically impacted. This has sparked lawsuits and backlash across the country — from Phoenix to Northern California — because communities were blindsided and meaningful engagement did not occur.
The OIG found the FAA relied heavily on judgment rather than transparent, data-based analysis, and that noise and environmental reviews used outdated standards that failed to reflect real community impact. The result has been a nationwide pattern: from Phoenix to Northern California to Washington, D.C., communities have seen steep rises in noise complaints, lawsuits, and demands for updated FAA standards and real community engagement. These reactions are not about opposition to aviation — it’s about ensuring modernization doesn’t come at the expense of public health and quality of life. People deserve meaningful notice, real participation in route planning, and updated noise standards that reflect today’s flight patterns, not those from decades ago.
In short: the FAA promised big benefits, but delivered less efficiency than expected, significant community harm, and a process that lacked transparency and accountability. Going forward, we need the FAA to modernize its noise standards, fully consider community health and livability, and include the public as real partners — not an afterthought — in airspace decisions.